There is no more urgent question in Polish-American relations today than the installation of the European portion of the American National Missile Defense system (NMD), known as "the shield" within Polish borders. The shape of the U.S.-Polish alliance depends in large measure on whether ten interceptor missiles will be installed in Poland and on whose terms

Meanwhile, the discussion of the issue has grown thick with misunderstanding and confusion due to the arrogance of the United States and the lack of resolve of Polish diplomats. It is no wonder that most Poles are opposed to the shield, as indicated by public opinion polls.

I belong to the minority of Poles who consider its installation to be in Poland's best interests. The political, strategic, or military advantages are not as obvious as in the case of NATO membership. I
vote in favor of the NMD after having weighed all factors involved. I must admit that the choice is not easy; however, I am compelled to agree with the basic argument that the shield would strengthen the
Polish-American alliance which is a vital element of Polish national security. We cannot rely on the European Union in this respect. Having its military installations on Polish territory, the U.S. would
be obliged to defend them. The invested interest is going to enhance the security guarantees mandated by NATO accords. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the principle of "one for all, all for one" is not just a "paper warranty" which failed us in 1939, as Radek Sikorski reminds us in a recent Washington Post article.

The shield is meant as a defense against a threat that is anything but imaginary. Although Iran, a potential aggressor, has no missiles today capable of reaching Poland, much less the U.S., it is building up its arsenal, while its pursuit of nuclear weapons development may put it possession of long-range nuclear missiles within a few years. A country ruled by a fanatic threatening America with destruction presents a real threat, as does radical Islam. The missile shield in Poland or the Czech Republic would defend not only the United States, but also Europe. Moreover, the NMD will be integrated into the NATO
system. As a member of the alliance, Poland should be able to count on the obligation of mutual defense. On the other hand, the presence of the shield would expose Poland to potential — if unlikely — attacks by America's enemies: "rogue" nations and Islamist terrorists. Should the interceptor base be
attacked, the U.S. would retaliate, Zbigniew Brzezinski reminds us; however, the field of battle might shift to Polish soil. Additionally, the shield is straining already tense relations between Poland and Russia. Consequently, Poland has every reason to demand additional security guarantees from Americans in exchange for agreeing to host the shield. Such demands were presented by Prime Minister Kaczynski on his visit to the U.S. last September. Radek Sikorski, the Minister of National Defense who accompanied the Prime Minister, stated at the time that the success of the talks depended on strengthening Polish aerial defense by installing patriot missiles and concluding an additional bilateral military agreement. The agreement would give Poland greater access to American military technology and intelligence information.

These demands are only natural and moderate. Their fulfillment would confirm that the U.S. treats Poland as a partner and not as a convenient political tool. The Bush administration, however, said
"No." Even more insulting, however, according to Sikorski's Washington Post article, was the fact that the U.S. administration formulated a draft of a positive response that the Polish government was supposed
to submit to Washington and appended it to the offer presented to Warsaw. Nevertheless, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, Dan Fried, continues to assure us that America never dictates its terms or plays the role of a new "Big Brother." Pressured by the Polish government, Pentagon representatives acted as if Poland was trying to extort an additional
advantage. Yet this is clearly not the case: Polish demands merely manifest the concern for the country's security. Bush's administration must have expected that? Poles' traditional admiration of America would lead the Poles to accepting the U.S. offer with uncritical glee. It forgot that fervent feelings of support for the U.S. in Poland have cooled off, mainly due to the absurd war in Iraq and to the reluctance to abolish visas for Polish visitors to the U.S.

Why are Americans refusing Polish demands? Perhaps it is because of the high cost of the additional assistance requested for national security, such as the patriot missiles of the THAAD system. Perhaps
the deterioration of relations with Russia, which threatens retaliation if the NMD is installed, tipped the scales. Yet that remains an American problem. Can Warsaw, however, demand anything at all from the U.S. and expect that Washington will treat our demands seriously? If Warsaw's demands are not met will Poland refuse to host the shield? Brzezinski reminds us that there is never any bilateral symmetry in dealing with a superpower. To the U.S. we are a small European country, much less important than France or Germany. On the other hand, we do have a few good cards to play in this game. The placement of the interceptor base in Poland remains the best military and technological option for the U.S. The construction in Poland would cost the American tax-payer much less than similar projects under way in Alaska or in California. Great Britain, another potential site for the launch base, would also be more costly than Poland. Additionally, Bush is keen on having the NMD established in Europe because it would strengthen the image of Republicans as strong on American national security in time for the 2008 elections.

Keeping the American motives in mind, the Polish government, represented by Sikorski, continued repeating until recently that it awaits a more specific offer before it says "yes." Americans, meanwhile, seem to have become equivocal in their intentions. In February it was revealed that Washington is conducting talks with London, although until then the administration assured us that the
installation of the base in Great Britain was out of the question. Is America signaling to Poland that "if you don't agree, the English will do it?" Yet, at the same time, Dan Fried and generals from the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) stated that Poland is entitled to make demands for greater national defense and that those requirements will be discussed.

Meanwhile, at the end of February or the beginning of March, Prime Minister Kaczyński declared that he is in support of the shield. This was not a revelation: the Western press has noted that the pro-American Polish government is definitely "for" it and only has the problem of selling the "shield" to the Sejm where the majority is against it. Reality, however, is one thing, and the perception of reality for diplomatic purposes is another. It is hard to understand why it was publicly announced that Poland supports the shield if we were bluffing that we unconditionally refuse it in order to get something in return. Why reveal the cards? Where is the consequence? After all, as I write this, formal negotiations have not even begun.

What's more, according to General Henry Obering, chief of MDA, negotiations may last until the end of the year. Perhaps open support for the shield is an element of a new sophisticated game? For if negotiations are going to last, one can withdraw from them. Perhaps Sikorski, despite demission, still takes part in the game—playing the part of an intransigent deal broker. But the Polish government's voltes-face and enigmatic pronouncements concerning the shield do not help convince the nation that it negotiates for Polish interests.

The situation is made more difficult by Russia and its threats. Russia knows very well that it is not a direct target of the missile defense system: the shield protects only against a limited missile arsenal. A vehement reaction to American plans lies in Kremlin's interest. At the same time, Russia realizes that it counts as an American ally in the conflict with Iran and tries not to overdo it. On the other hand, allegations that the shield is synonymous with the beginning of another cold war provoked reactions on the part of the "old Europe,"as predicted by Moscow. Germany and France expressed their reservations concerning the NMD and reproached the Americans for conducting talks with Eastern Europe without prior consultation.

Moscow's skillful diplomacy seems to have successfully driven a wedge between Poland and its Western-European allies who are deathly afraid of a conflict with Russia. Poland once again is cast in the role of an embarrassing American "Trojan horse" on the old continent. The role might have been convenient before the invasion of Iraq, when the U.S. relations with France and Germany were rather fraught, and Washington was ready to compromise in return for Polish support of the war. Leszek Miller's government, however, proved inept and did not use the occasion to its advantage. Today the configuration had changed: Poland
is already a member of the European Union, receives billions of euros in aid from its budget, and must mind its manners. In the meantime, Washington had reconciled with Berlin and Paris, its traditional partners. It can thus afford to remain tough on the question of the
shield. In an interview for Polish channel TVN, Dan Fried promised "advantages for local Polish companies" contracted on the construction of the missile launch base. As usual, he assured Poland that never again will it find itself alone.