"After all we are discussing business and politics and not emotions. In my opinion, however, our political decisions speak for themselves: they are an investment that has a good rate of return."

Tomasz Zalewski interviews Janusz Reiter, the Polish ambassador to the United States

We are expecting two visits: President George W. Bush arrives in Poland on June 8, and Polish President Lech Kaczynski is going to visit the U.S. on July 15. Why the sudden intense exchange at the highest level? What is going to be the theme of these visits?

Janusz Reiter: The international political arena has been very animated lately. Many critical meetings have been taking place. Most of them are focused on the issue of European security. Poland’s participation in these talks is a positive sign. However, it is too early to discuss the programs of either President Bush’s visit to Poland or President Kaczynski’s visit to the U.S.

Poland has a reputation for being America’s most loyal ally in Europe. Some have nicknamed the country “the American Trojan horse on the old continent.” Even more spitefully, some call Poland a “mule,” suggesting that it is doing everything that Washington commends. Is that true?

J.R.: Absolutely not. It is not true that the whole history of Polish-American relations since 1989 has been a history of consent to American desires. I cannot recall anything Poland has done against its will to satisfy what the U.S. wishes. We have been responsible for ourselves and acted in accordance with our own desires. Whether this is right or wrong is open to discussion. In my opinion, we were right, but we have not confused American interests with our own.

The current Polish government and the ruling parties of the past 18 years have been politically pro-American. At the state level, we are friends, but at the level of public opinion, distrust of America is growing, mainly due to the wide-spread conviction that Poland was not sufficiently compensated for its aid in the Iraq war.

J.R.: Poland’s compensation needs to be re-evaluated. It is always legitimate to question the return on our investment, meaning our policy decisions regarding the U.S. After all we are discussing business and politics and not emotions. In my opinion, however, our political decisions speak for themselves: they are an investment that has a good rate of return.

Why is it, then, that the average Pole does not perceive it this way? Public opinion surveys in Poland show that America’s popularity is falling, while the Polish-American alliance is being viewed with growing skepticism.

J.R.: This is due to the complexity of the problem. During Communism, we were a country isolated from America not only geographically, but also politically. In the eyes of most Poles, the U.S. was a friendly but distant nation. Today America is much closer to Poland, although it continues to maintain stronger relations with Western Europe. The greater America’s involvement in Poland, the stronger the ties between the two nations will be. We should not delude ourselves, however: the potential for conflict will also be proportionally greater. As a result, the psychology of Polish-American relations is changing.

What is this psychology like in Western Europe where, as you have pointed out, the American presence has been more prominent for a longer period of time?

J.R.: I would describe the approach of some Europeans to America with the German term Hassliebe, meaning a love-hate relationship. They appear to draw their faith in themselves from their criticism of America. I am not speaking here of governments, since they are conducting, 

especially today, a very rational form of politics towards the U.S., but they must avoid any action that would make them liable to be criticized by public opinion for being too submissive to Washington. European public opinion is obsessively afraid of American supremacy. Is the same thing going to happen in Poland? We can’t exclude that possibility, but we must do everything to avoid it.

But isn’t this “obsession” with America a natural reaction to the arrogance of the only superpower left in the aftermath of the Cold War? Since his first term in office, George W. Bush’s government has conducted a politics of disregard for his allies, for the U.N., and even for some international treaties.

J.R.: This is the opinion expressed, among others, by Zbigniew Brzezinski. But I think that this attitude is a sign of Europe’s lack of confidence in itself. If it had a greater sense of its own worth, it would not have such a strong need to oppose the U.S.

Does Poland really face, however, the threat of this obsessive, and hence irrational, anti-American stand? Aren’t we rather at a different stage, more rational, of finally treating relations with America without sentiments and thus being guided by our own interests?

J.R.: If we are becoming more critical, which is to say more aware of our own national interests, that is great. I am only afraid of these continued suspicions that we are giving in to America because we are a smaller and weaker nation. Such suspicions create a pressure to oppose the U.S. on the first possible occasion: to say no just in order to feel better. It may happen that we will be forced to say no to America, and not just on principle—in order to strengthen the national ego—but because it will be in our national interest.

Has Poland ever said no to America after 1989?

J.R.: Naturally. It is only a myth that we have always yielded to the U.S. Poland has not supported the U.S., for instance, on the issue of the International Criminal Court[1]. Washington was counting on our vote then. The issue did not create a great controversy in Poland nor a public conflict with the U.S. The Polish government considered that we need advertise our difference in the matter. The Polish and U.S. governments also differed on the question of the Kyoto Treaty[2]. Such situations happen. But I admit that it might be useful to be more vocal about our differences in opinion sometimes. The people of Poland need to know that our government is independent.

Since we are talking about mutual interests... Why doesn’t the U.S. increase its aid to Poland to support the modernization of the Polish army? The amount they currently share is minimal when one considers the size of the American economy.

J.R.: I have been very skeptical with respect to this matter from the start, and have expressed the opinion that we should expect much more support. The American policy of military aid is governed by a certain logic that does not include significant help to Poland. America, as is widely known, extends its greatest support to Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, which is a geopolitical bonus for these nations which play a stabilizing role in the turbulent and dangerous regions of great strategic importance to the U.S.

In other words, America does not consider Poland to be an ally of sufficient strategic importance…

J.R.: Americans simply do not view Eastern Europe as the European equivalent of the Middle East. Poland does not play the role of Israel in our region. The threats to our part of Europe are entirely different. That is why expectations of military aid such as the U.S. extends to the Middle East are unrealistic. Besides, Poland today is a developed country, much wealthier than it used to be, and this reaps its own consequences.

The number one topic today is the American plan to locate the European portion of a nuclear missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Poland is expressing growing doubts whether we are going to gain more or lose, while our government, it seems, has already accepted the American offer…

J.R.: This is only an impression, rather than reality: we have not agreed to anything yet. Formal negotiations are only beginning, and the result of those negotiations is far from certain.

What are we going to negotiate?

J.R.: Everything. Not just technical details. We will mainly discuss how to reconcile Polish and American expectations concerning the shield. According to the U.S., the shield is going to serve primarily as a defense against the Middle East. It is a real threat, although Europe, including Poland, does not consider it to be a top priority. Poles feel the country’s vulnerability is due to its geographical location and the proximity of the former Soviet block. This is where our need for security comes from. It is important therefore that the shield has an explicit value when it comes to our country’s security and not just with respect to the Middle East, as important as it may be. It must also be emphasized that everything that contributes to tightening the relations with the U.S., especially in the military sphere, will be to Poland’s advantage. 

Russia’s opposition to the shield is a clear effort to drive a wedge between Europe and Poland and other Eastern-European nations. Isn’t it succeeding, considering the fact that the division of “new” and “old” Europe is reviving?

J.R.: Russia presents a delicate problem. Americans are correct to say that the shield is neither a defense against, nor a threat to Russia. For their part, the Russians pretend that they don’t understand this point of view. It is clearly a political game. This is kind of double-play must be taken seriously, if only because of its effectiveness in Europe. Both America and Poland are doing everything to prevent the shield from dividing Europe. It’s not a question of satisfying everybody, but of strengthening support for the NMD. The goal is to minimize the political costs of the shield.

The American NMD is going to expose Poland to a greater risk of attacks from America’s enemies: Iran, Islamist terrorists, etc. Does that not justify Poland’s demands to be armed with Patriot missiles, or THAAD, which would strengthen our air defense against the short- and medium-range missiles? NMD protects only against long-range missiles.

J.R.: Americans would reply that the NMD may well complement the NATO missile defense system which protects Europe against short- and medium-range missiles. It would be ideal to combine the two systems. However, I understand American arguments that if we wanted first to integrate the NATO system and the NMD, the implementation of the project would be postponed indefinitely, since it would mean submitting it to the decision-making of a wider group.

Does Poland’s involvement in Afghanistan serve our national interest? This issue is also the source of many controversies, especially after the bad experience in Iraq…

J.R.: Our national interest is not obvious, but the same can be said for the Germans, British, or Dutch: no one in Europe has an obvious interest in the region, but if everyone withdrew, Afghanistan would soon become a breeding ground for terrorism, a safe-house for all political bullies, and a gigantic opium plantation. The thought that it is in Poland’s interest to make Afghanistan a safe place is not as obvious to the Poles and requires a certain change in mentality. It is taking place, albeit reluctantly.

When can we expect visa requirement to be lifted for Poles traveling to the U.S.?

J.R. This is a good example of a Sisyphean task. I am not even sure whether we are currently at the stage of pushing the rock up or seeing it roll down the hill…

Is it that bad?!

J.R.: Perhaps not. In the end, I believe that we will succeed. The problem is that the elimination of visas has a few supporters in the U.S. Congress, but not many. The visa question simply is not a priority which can be promoted on its own. It’s not a train with its own locomotive, but rather a wagon that needs to be attached to a train. Right now that wagon is hooked up to the 9-11 bill[3]. It appears that either the train never reached its destination— the passing of the bill—or that the wagon was detached. Now, it is not even certain that the “9-11” bill is going to get anywhere. I believe that our wagon finally will reach its destination, but it is true that it is taking longer than anticipated and it is frustrating for someone who is not familiar with the political mechanisms in the U.S. Even though the visa issue is destined to be resolved positively, I would not offer any definite deadlines.

The problem is that the elimination of visas is becoming a hot topic for Poles who can freely travel to Western European countries and legally work there…

J.R.: Of course, that is why I keep telling Americans that they should not delay.

Trade between Poland and the U.S. is still relatively small. What can be done to increase it?

J.R. Government’s influence is limited here. Of course, better promotion of Polish trade would be beneficial, but at the current rate of trade exchanges, no one is going to channel great resources toward that goal. It’s a bit of a vicious circle. If only for geographical reasons, Polish trade with the U.S. will never be as important as that with the European Union. American investments in Poland, however, have potential. The fact that we are part of the E.U. presents great advantages for American investors. We know that American investments in Poland mean an increase in Polish exports to the U.S.; American companies will export Polish products to America.

What is your view of the role of the Polish-American community in supporting Polish interests? How can it help?

J.R.: I don’t have a good answer. The question is: how can we best utilize the existence of a large Polish-American population in the U.S? At this time there is no longer an obvious political goal to mobilize the Polish-American community, yet ethnic lobbies in the U.S. can be effective. The examples of Armenian, Greek, or Irish lobbies show that the country of origin does not have to be in such need as Poland was under Communism for Poles to have an efficient lobby. I don’t know how to accomplish that, but it certainly can be done. How — the answer to that won’t be found either in Warsaw or in the Polish embassy in Washington. I am not saying that the Polish lobby does not exist, but is its influence proportionate to the size of Polish community? It could be much stronger. Beyond political action, other useful endeavors can be undertaken, such as the 

publication of Plus Journal. It really is an excellent example of a modern instrument of Polish integration in the U.S., and of avoiding a false choice between assimilation and preserving national heritage. I know of other examples across the U.S. where Polish communities have been effective, for instance in Seattle, where I visited recently.

In the 1990s you were the Polish ambassador to Germany. How could you compare that experience to Polish diplomacy in the U.S.?

J.R.: Germany and America are two very different countries. In the case of Germany, the difficulties were of historical and emotional nature. In America, the problem lies in the fact that I am representing a European country of 38 million, while the U.S. is conscious of its power in the world. This means that Washington is an extremely difficult diplomatic market: there is constant competition for American attention, favor, support, and friendship. Such fierce competition does not exist in Europe. At the same time, however, the U.S. is a very open country and everyone has a chance to compete. Even an ambassador may conduct some political lobbying here. I do such lobbying myself: I walk around the U.S. Capitol and talk to congressmen and senators. In Europe this activity is not acceptable: you must communicate with the ministry of foreign affairs. An ambassador may address the parliament, but in a more formal manner. As a result, much can be achieved in the U.S. but only if one knows the lobbying mechanisms. All in all, America remains a very demanding partner and to cooperate with it one must be well-prepared.

There have been rumors in Poland lately that your term in Washington may be cut…

J.R.: [Laughs] I will reply with a well-known dictum from Mark Twain: “The rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated.” In my profession one can talk about many things, but it’s best not to speak about oneself.

Thank you for the conversation.